Are children's memory illusions created differently from those of adults? Evidence from levels-of-processing and divided attention paradigms by Wimmer, M. C. & Howe, M. L.
Wimmer, M. C. & Howe, M. L. (2010). Are children's memory illusions created differently from those 
of adults? Evidence from levels-of-processing and divided attention paradigms. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 107(1), pp. 31-49. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2010.03.003 
City Research Online
Original citation: Wimmer, M. C. & Howe, M. L. (2010). Are children's memory illusions created 
differently from those of adults? Evidence from levels-of-processing and divided attention 
paradigms. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 107(1), pp. 31-49. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2010.03.003 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/4206/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
RUNNING HEAD: Different generation of children’s and adults’ false memories 
 
Are Children’s Memory Illusions Created Differently than Adults’?   
Evidence from Levels-of-Processing and Divided Attention Paradigms 
Marina C. Wimmer and Mark L. Howe 
Lancaster University 
 
Send correspondence to: Dr. Marina C. Wimmer 
    Centre for Research in Human Development 
    Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK  LA1 4YF 
    email: m.wimmer@lancaster.ac.uk 
Authors’ Note 
We thank Lauren Knott for comments on a previous draft of this manuscript.  Marina C. 
Wimmer and Mark L. Howe, Centre for Research in Human Development, Lancaster 
University, UK.  This research was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council, UK (RES-062-23-0452) to Mark L. Howe.  Correspondence 
concerning this research should be sent to Marina C. Wimmer or Mark L. Howe, Centre 
for Research in Human Development Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF, United 
Kingdom, e-mail: m.wimmer@lancaster.ac.uk, mark.howe@lancaster.ac.uk. 
 
IN PRESS   Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
 2 
Abstract 
In two experiments we investigated the robustness and automaticity of adults’ and 
children’s generation of false memories by using a levels-of-processing paradigm 
(Experiment 1) and a divided-attention paradigm (Experiment 2).  The first experiment 
revealed that when information was encoded at a shallow level, true recognition rates 
decreased for all ages.  For false recognition, when information was encoded on a 
shallow level we found a different pattern for young children compared to older children 
and adults.  Seven-year-olds’ false recognition rates were related to the overall amount 
correctly remembered information whereas no such association was found for the other 
age groups.  In the second experiment divided attention decreased true recognition for all 
ages.  In contrast, children’s (7- and 11-year-olds) false recognition rates were again 
dependent on the overall amount correctly remembered whereas adults’ false recognition 
was left unaffected.  Overall, children’s false recognition rates changed when levels-of-
processing or divided-attention was manipulated in comparison to adults.  Together these 
results suggest that there may be both quantitative and qualitative changes in false 
memory rates with age.      
 
Keywords: False memories; Memory development; Automaticity; Levels-of-processing; 
Divided attention
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Are Children’s Memory Illusions Created Differently than Adults’?   
Evidence from Levels-of-Processing and Divided Attention Paradigms  
A vast amount of research over the past fifteen years has used the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995) in order to investigate memory errors in adults.  Here, participants study word lists 
containing items (e.g., bed, rest snore, awake, dream) that are all associated with a non-
presented item, the “critical lure” (e.g., sleep).  When asked to remember the presented 
items, some participants also falsely remember the critical lure among the correct list 
items.  This robust false memory effect has also been observed in children.  Interestingly, 
as children’s overall memory capacity increases over the primary school period, so too 
does their false memory rate (e.g., Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 2006; Carneiro, 
Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Howe, 2006; 
2008).  This finding from the DRM paradigm is striking because it suggests that here 
children’s net memory accuracy decreases over childhood (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 
2008).   
In order to explain this counterintuitive increase in false memories with age, two 
theories have emerged.  Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) suggests 
that presented information is encoded by two different memory traces, a verbatim trace 
that encodes surface features of items (e.g., the color of a word, specific font of a word) 
and a gist trace that encodes the overall meaning of an item or a list of items (i.e., the 
overall theme).  It is this gist trace that is thought to be responsible for false memories in 
the DRM paradigm, particularly when verbatim traces, ones that fade more rapidly than 
gist traces, are no longer available.  Developmentally, children’s ability to extract the gist 
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of to-be-remembered information improves with age.  As this ability increases with age, 
so too does children’s susceptibility to the DRM illusion (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  
Alternatively, Associative-Activation Theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & 
Plumpton, 2009a) suggests that true and false memories are both a product of automatic 
associative activation processes.  In particular, this theory derives from the idea of 
spreading activation, also discussed in Activation-Monitoring Theory (Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) for adults’ false memory.  The basic idea is that in an 
associative network, the processing of one word activates a corresponding node in our 
mental lexicon and this activation spreads to surrounding concept nodes (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Kimball, Smith, & Kahana, 2007; Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  False 
memories occur because the critical lure is activated many times due to its association 
with the presented list items in the associative network.  Children’s false memories 
increase with age because of changes in children’s knowledge base which result in 
increases in the automaticity with which children access and activate associations in their 
knowledge base, including associations that mediate false remembering (e.g., Howe, 
Wimmer, & Blease, 2009b).  
In sum, both FTT a dual-process theory and AAT a single-process theory, provide 
an explanation of why the quantity of false memories increases with age.  However, 
irrespective of the theoretical basis of the source of the occurrence of false memories, the 
question that remains to be answered is, when false memories occur, are these false 
memories qualitatively different for children and adults?   
This question is of fundamental importance for the legal arena, where children are 
used as eyewitnesses.  For some time it was thought that children were unreliable as 
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eyewitnesses.  Due to extensive research, it has been shown that although overall children 
remember fewer facts than adults, children are capable of providing accurate accounts of 
past experiences.  However, what is still unclear is under which conditions false 
memories occur in children.  For example, do false memories arise only out of 
consciously experienced events or also out of incidentally experienced events?  The aim 
of the current research is to investigate these possibilities.   
For adults, the general consensus is that false memories occur automatically, 
outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; 
Seamon, Luo, Shulman, Toner, & Caglar, 2002) but can reach conscious awareness in 
some circumstances (e.g., McDermott, 1997).  For example, false memories occur even 
when information has been encoded incidentally (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004), or even after 
adults are forewarned about the false memory phenomenon (Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 
1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McDermott & Roediger, 1998).  Similarly, 
when adults are instructed to “forget” a just studied word list then only true recall but not 
false recall is reduced (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Seamon, et al., 2002; but see Marche, 
Brainerd, Lane, & Loehr, 2005 for a different finding using a different method).  Thus, at 
least for adults, false memories appear to occur relatively automatically, both at the 
generation or encoding stage (i.e., evidence from incidental memory studies and 
forewarning procedures) and at the output or retrieval phase (i.e., evidence from directed 
forgetting studies). 
What evidence do we have concerning the automaticity of children’s false 
memories at the generation (encoding) and output (retrieval) phases?  To date there is 
only one study that examined the development of automatic associative processes in 
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relation to false memories at the generation stage (Wimmer & Howe, 2009) and only a 
single study on automaticity at the output stage (Howe, 2005).  In particular, using a 
modified DRM paradigm it has been shown that there is a developmental increase of 
automaticity in activating associative relations in one’s knowledge base.  However, 
associative activation is already fairly automatic in 5-year-olds when it is mapped onto a 
child’s knowledge base (Wimmer & Howe, 2009).  This finding gives some indication 
that children’s formation of associations that can lead to false memories may be relatively 
automatic.  Alternatively, at the output stage the story is different.  Here, in contrast to 
adults, children’s false memories, like their true memories, all but disappeared when 
given a directed forgetting instruction (Howe, 2005).  That is, children, but not adults, 
were able to inhibit false memories during the output phase.  If information can only be 
intentionally inhibited if it is active in consciousness, then these results suggest that there 
are qualitative differences in children’s and adults’ false memories at the retrieval phase.  
That is, children’s false memories can be consciously inhibited at output whereas adults’ 
false memories are automatically output outside of conscious awareness.  These 
developmental differences at the output stage raise the question as to whether similar 
qualitative differences in automaticity exist between children and adults during the 
generation or encoding stage.  Because directed-forgetting paradigms assess conscious 
and explicit inhibitory processes after information has been encoded, the question is 
whether the generation or initial activation of false information occurs automatically in 
children as it does in adults.  Although children generate fewer false memories than 
adults, the question is when they do generate false memories, are they generated in the 
same automatic, unconscious fashion as those of adults?  
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To date, the automaticity and robustness of false memory effects in adults has 
been shown in studies that have used a levels-of-processing or divided-attention 
paradigm.  The assumption is that if false memories are generated automatically and 
unconsciously, then conditions that affect conscious associative activation or gist 
extraction, such as different levels of processing and attentional mode, should have very 
little effect on false memory generation.  If false memories are generated via elaborative 
and conscious processes, then levels of processing and divided attention should affect the 
generation of false memories as it does for true memories.  The aim of the current 
research is to investigate whether children’s false memories are generated using similar 
automatic processes as those found in adults.  To our knowledge there is no published 
research on children’s false memories using a levels-of-processing or a divided-attention 
paradigm.  Therefore, we investigate both children’s and adults’ automaticity of false 
memory generation under different levels-of-processing (Experiment 1) and divided-
attention manipulations (Experiment 2).  
Levels-of-Processing 
Studies of the effects of levels-of-processing on adults’ true and false memories 
have shown that these effects vary systematically depending on whether the studied 
information was processed in a shallow or deep manner.  For shallow processing, 
participants focus on surface or verbatim features of presented information (e.g., number 
of vowels in a word) whereas for deep processing participants focus on the gist or 
meaning of a word (e.g., rating the pleasantness of a word).  Deep processing increases 
associative activation whereas shallow processing decreases associative activation.  
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Research with adults using levels-of-processing has produced mixed results 
concerning the effects on true and false memories (Read, 1996; Rhodes & Anastasi, 
2000; Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999; Tussing & 
Greene, 1997).  Three studies have demonstrated that when information is encoded using 
deep processing, significant increases occur in both true and false memory rates relative 
to when that same information is processed in a shallow fashion.  Moreover, these effects 
were obtained regardless of whether recall or recognition measures were used (Rhodes & 
Anastasi, 2000; Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia et al., 1999).  In contrast, two other 
studies found few effects of levels-of-processing on true and false memories (Read, 1996; 
Tussing & Greene, 1997).  Specifically, Tussing and Greene (1997) found no effect of 
levels-of-processing on true and false recognition.  However, it has been noted that it was 
not clear in this study whether levels-of-processing did not affect true and false 
recognition or was simply not manipulated properly (see Thapar & McDermott, 2001; 
Toglia et al., 1999).  As well, Read (1996) found that deep processing increased true 
recall but had no effect on false recall, whereas shallow processing decreased false recall.  
However, this study has been criticized because only a single DRM list was used (i.e., the 
sleep list) (see Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia et al., 1999).   
Together, these studies fail to provide a clear picture of the effects of,levels-of-
processing on true and false memories.  These inconsistent findings arising out of 
between-participants manipulations may be a result of individual differences in false 
memory formation.  That is, some individuals are more prone to false memories than 
others (see Gallo, 2006 for an overview of individual differences in false memories).  
Therefore, in the current research we will control for individual differences between 
 9 
participants by using a within-participant design.  Once these differences are reduced, 
like what the research above also suggests, false memories should still occur under 
shallow processing indicating that at least adults’ false memories are generated 
automatically.    
 Divided Attention 
Research using divided-attention paradigms has also produced inconsistent results 
concerning true and false memories.  In a typical divided-attention paradigm, participants 
receive instructions to memorize presented information while performing a secondary 
task (e.g., generating random numbers).  Overall, dividing attention decreases true 
memory in comparison to full attention.  For false memories, dividing attention has 
different effects on false recall than on false recognition.  In particular, it has been shown 
that the introduction of a secondary task at encoding increases false recall (Dewhurst, 
Barry, & Holmes, 2005; Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002; Peters, Jelicic, Gorski, 
Sijstermans, Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, 2008) but decreases false recognition (Dewhurst, 
et al., 2005; Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, & Bathurst, 2007).  Similarly, when 
introducing an additional memory load at encoding rather than using a divided attention 
paradigm, false recognition is reduced (but only in a between-participants condition not 
in a within-participant design) (Seamon, et al., 1998).  It has also been shown that divided 
attention at encoding impairs true recognition but not false recognition (Seamon et al., 
2003).   
Overall, the research on divided attention yields inconsistent results and a direct 
comparison between studies is difficult because the secondary tasks that have been used 
differ across studies (Gallo, 2006).  Furthermore, different results have been obtained 
 10 
depending on whether a within- or between-participants design has been used and 
whether recall, recognition, or both have been investigated.  One explanation for the 
contrasting findings of an increase of false recall in comparison to a decrease of false 
recognition when dividing attention at encoding is that participants adopt a criterion shift 
in recall (Dewhurst et al., 2005, 2007).  That is, at recall participants realize that their 
performance is poorer in a divided-attention paradigm and therefore compensate by 
adopting a lower threshold for considering an item as presented and thus recall is more 
prone to the false memory illusion.   
In sum, despite the mixed results of divided-attention on true and false memories, 
similar to the studies that have used a levels-of-processing paradigm, false memories still 
occur when items are studied under conditions that divide attention.  This finding 
indicates that adults’ false memory production is fairly robust and is not eliminated under 
conditions that divide attention, another indication that adults’ false memories arise out of 
automatic processing.  In what follows, we examine whether children’s false memories 
are generated in a similar, automatic fashion. 
Experiments 1 and 2 
To our knowledge, no published study has directly investigated whether 
children’s and adults’ false memories are generated in a qualitatively different manner, 
particularly whether they differ in terms of their associative activation processes (i.e., 
conscious versus automatic).  The aim of the current research is to investigate this by 
using a levels-of-processing paradigm (Experiments 1) and a divided-attention paradigm 
(Experiments 2).  Across both experiments 7- and 11-year-old children and adults take 
part.  These age groups were chosen because there is a significant developmental increase 
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in the quantity of false memories generated (e.g., Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009).  
Including this age range will allow us to directly compare changes in quantity to changes 
in quality of false memory formation.  If children’s false memories are generated less 
automatically than adults’ and are constructed using conscious associative activation 
processes, then, like true memories, they should be considerably reduced under shallow 
processing conditions (Experiments 1) and under divided attention conditions 
(Experiments 2).  In both experiments we used a recognition paradigm because as already 
noted, it is not clear whether encoding manipulations interfere with associative activation 
processes or cause a criterion shift in adult participants when measured using a recall 
paradigm.  Furthermore, both levels-of-processing and divided-attention were 
manipulated within participant.  This within-manipulation was necessary because, as 
noted above, it controls for individual differences in false memory formation, where 
some people are more prone to false memories than others (Gallo, 2006), something that 
may explain the inconsistent results of previous studies of levels-of-processing and 
divided attention.   
Experiment 1 requires a specific response to each item during study whereas 
Experiment 2 requires dividing attention between a secondary task and the DRM task at 
study.  If shallow processing and divided attention interfere with memory processes, then 
true recognition should be reduced compared to standard/deep levels-of-processing and 
full attention.  If false memories arise out of conscious processes, then shallow 
processing and divided attention should also reduce false recognition compared to 
standard/deep processing levels and full attention.  If false memories arise from 
automatic associative processes, then false recognition should not be significantly 
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reduced under shallow processing levels and divided attention compared to standard/deep 
processing levels and full attention  respectively 
Experiment 1  
In the first experiment, we implemented a classical levels-of-processing design, 
one that is similar to those previously with adults (e.g., Thapar & McDermott, 2001).  
However, instead of using pleasantness ratings as a deep processing manipulation, 
something that may pose problems for younger children, we presented DRM lists in a 
story format, one that bears similarities to that used in earlier research on children’s false 
memories (Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007).  Presenting DRM lists in a story format 
has been already successfully implemented with 5-year-old children in Dewhurst and 
colleagues’ study, thus, our 7-year-olds should have no problems with this type of 
manipulation.  We created our own sentences conveying a story (see Appendix).   This 
was necessary because each sentence was presented separately and the last word of each 
sentence was the to-be-remembered item. 
We created a comparable shallow processing condition in which participants 
simply counted the number of words in each sentence of the story.  Concerning the 
automaticity of false memories, there are two possible outcomes: If false memories are 
automatic, then levels-of-processing should have little effect on false memory rates 
whereas if false memories arise out of conscious processes, then shallow processing 
should decrease, and deep processing should increase, false memory rates.  Moreover, if 
children’s false memories are generated in a similar way as adults’ then we expect no age 
differences in the pattern of shallow versus deep versus standard processing. 




A total of 63 children and adults (60% female) participated in this experiment, 20 
7-year-olds (M = 7.7, SD = 3 months), 20 11-year-olds (M = 11.7, SD = 5 months), and 
23 adults (M = 20 years, SD = 1 year).  The children were predominantly White, from a 
working class background, and were tested following parental consent and their own 
assent on the day of testing.  The adults were undergraduate students and received 
financial reimbursement for their participation.  
Design 
Each participant received six 13-item DRM lists.  The lists were presented in 
three different levels-of-processing study formats: (1) standard: 2 standard DRM lists, (2) 
deep: 2 sentence DRM lists, and (3) shallow: 2 sentence counting-the-number-of-words 
DRM lists.  After that children received an age appropriate 3½-minute distractor task 
followed by a recognition task.  
Materials and Procedure 
The six 13-item DRM lists¹ (sleep, cold, bread, doctor, lion, and shirt) were all 
presented orally and visually at a 2 second rate on a Mac computer.  This dual 
presentation mode was implemented because in the shallow processing condition it was 
necessary to visualize the sentences in order to count the number of letters.  Thus, for 
reasons of comparison, the standard and deep processing conditions had to follow the 
same modality of presentation.  Moreover, presenting information in both formats 
simultaneously allows for controlling for potential differences in reading capacity 
between the younger and older participants.  That is, because participants heard and saw 
 14 
each item/sentence simultaneously, they were not required to read them themselves.  
Participants across all conditions were instructed to remember as many items as possible.  
After each list, a neutral filler picture appeared for 2 seconds in order to mark the end of 
one list and the beginning of the next list.  There were 3 list pairs (shirt/lion, sleep/doctor, 
and bread/cold).  The list pairs used for each condition and the presentation order were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
All participants received two standard DRM, two deep-meaning DRM, and two 
shallow-meaning DRM lists.  In the standard levels-of-processing condition participants 
received a standard DRM paradigm.  In the deep meaning processing condition 
participants received a sentence DRM paradigm, and were presented with sentences 
where the last item of each sentence was displayed in bold and underlined. Participants 
were instructed that this last item was the to-be-remembered item.  All sentences within a 
list conveyed a story.  In the shallow meaning processing condition, participants received 
a sentence DRM paradigm that followed the same procedure as the sentence paradigm 
except that participants were also asked to count the number of words in each sentence.  
Participants received two practise sentences that were not associated with the sentences 
that followed in order to familiarize them with the procedure.  Next, participants received 
a 3½-minute age-appropriate distractor task (visual search game for children and 
mathematical calculations for adults), followed by a recognition task.  The recognition 
task consisted of 48 items: 24 correct list items (4 per list), 12 related non-presented items 






First, we examined whether participants’ recognition performance was above 
chance².  We conducted a one-sample t-test with 0.5 as the test statistic comparing 
children’s and adults’ performance against chance on all 4 item types (correct, related 
non-presented, unrelated non-presented, and critical lures).  Seven-year-olds performed 
above chance on all item types (at least p < .05 and higher) except during shallow 
processing for both correct items and critical lures.  Thus, 7-year-olds had no problems 
with the task demands of processing and remembering information when it was presented 
in the form of single items or sentences conveying a story, but encountered problems 
when information was processed incidentally under shallow processing.  In contrast, 11-
year-olds and adults performed above chance on all item types (at least p < .01 and 
higher).  In sum, shallow processing only affected 7-year-olds’ chance performance for 
both correct items and critical lures.  
True and False Recognition 
Next, we analyzed age and levels-of-processing effects for true and false 
recognition.  Proportion of “yes” responses to studied items, critical lures, related items, 
and unrelated items were analyzed separately in a series of 3(levels-of-processing: 
standard vs. deep vs. shallow) x 3(age: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) where the first factor was within-participant and the second factor 
was between-participants.  Mean recognition scores are shown in Table 1.  
For studied items there was a main effect for levels-of-processing, F(2, 120) = 
26.59, p < .001, ηp² = .31, where Bonferroni post-hoc tests (p < .001) revealed that fewer 
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items were correctly recognized following shallow processing (M = .65) than either the 
standard (M = .84) or deep processing conditions (M = .84), and the latter two conditions 
did not differ.  There was also a main effect for age, F(2, 60) = 9.57, p < .001, ηp² = .24, 
where Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that 7-year-olds (M = .66, p = .017) correctly 
recognized fewer items than both 11-year-olds (M = .80) and adults (M  = .86, p < .001) 
and the latter two age groups did not differ.  Further, there was a marginally significant 
Age x Levels-of-processing interaction, F(4, 120) = 2.35, p = .058, ηp² = .07.  This 
interaction occurred because 7-year-olds (p < .001) recognized less following shallow 
processing (M = .48) than deep (M = .72) or standard processing (M = .80), and the latter 
two conditions did not differ.  For 11-year-olds (p = .021) their correct recognition was 
lower following shallow (M = .70) than standard processing (M = .86) or deep processing 
(M = .84), and the latter two conditions did not differ.  In contrast, adults (p = .006) 
remembered less following shallow (M = .76) than deep processing (M = .95) both of 
which did not differ from standard processing (M = .88).  Thus across all ages, shallow 
processing reduced correct recognition whereas the effect of deep processing was less 
clear.  
For false recognition of critical lures, there was no effect for levels-of-processing 
but there was a main effect for age, F(2, 60) = 3.37, p = .041, ηp² = .10.  Post-hoc 
Bonferroni adjacent age groups’ comparisons (p = .036) indicated that 7-year-olds (M = 
.66) had fewer false memories than 11-year-olds (M = .82) who in turn did not differ 
from adults (M = .74).  However, the difference between 7-year-olds’ and adults’ false 
memories did not reach significance.    
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Finally, for related and unrelated non-presented items there were no main effects 
or interactions.  Together, these results show levels of processing affected only true 
recollection.  That is, although false memory rates increased with age, levels-of-
processing had no effect on false recognition whereas it did have an effect on true 
recognition.  
Overall Accuracy and False Alarms 
Because children are known to have a yea-saying bias, in order to obtain an 
overall index of accuracy and an estimate of false alarm rates, we used the two-high 
threshold correction³ (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  For true recognition we calculated H 
– FA(U), where H is the proportion of correct responses to studied items and FA(U) is 
the proportion of false alarms to unrelated distractors.  For false recognition to critical 
lures we calculated FA(CL) – FA(U), where FA(CL) is the proportion of false alarms to 
the critical lures.  
Using the corrected scores for true recognition we calculated a 3(levels-of-
processing: standard vs. deep vs. shallow) x 3(age: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. 
adults) ANOVA.  The results were similar to the uncorrected scores and revealed a main 
effect for levels-of-processing (Figure 1), F(2, 120) = 18.68, p < .001, ηp² = .24.  Post-hoc 
Bonferroni comparisons (p < .001) showed that fewer items were correctly identified 
following shallow processing (M = .58) than deep (M = .78) or standard processing (M = 
.78), and the latter two conditions did not differ.  There was also a main effect for age, 
F(2, 60) = 10.30, p < .001, ηp² = .26.  Post-hoc Bonferroni age groups’ comparisons 
indicated that there was a reliable difference between 7-year-olds (M = .57) and both 11-
year-olds (M = .76, p = .004) and adults (M = .81, p < .001) and the latter two age groups 
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did not differ.  Furthermore, there was a Levels-of-processing x Age interaction, F(4, 
120) = 2.97, p = .022, ηp² = .09.  This interaction occurred because the youngest age 
group had a unique order of correct recognition as a function of levels-of-processing in 
comparison to the older participants.  For 7-year-olds, more items were recognized 
following standard processing (M = .75) than deep (M = .59, p = .041) or shallow 
processing (M = .38, p = .008).  For 11-year-olds, marginally significantly (p = .059) 
more items were recognized following deep processing (M = .84) than shallow 
processing (M = .68) but there was no difference in comparison to standard processing 
(M = .76).  For adults we found the same pattern: deep processing (M = .91) increased 
correct recognition in comparison to shallow processing (M = .67, p = .002) and neither 
differed from standard processing (M = .83).  Together these findings from the corrected 
scores suggest that deep processing enhances true recognition and shallow processing 
decreases true recognition for adults and 11-year-olds but not necessarily in comparison 
to standard processing conditions.  In contrast, for 7-year-olds shallow processing 
decreases true recognition but only in comparison to standard processing.  The effect of 
deep processing in 7-year-olds was less clear.    
For false recognition (Figure 1), using the corrected scores, we did not find an 
effect for levels-of-processing but did find one for age, F(2, 60) = 5.16 p = .009, ηp² = 
.15.  Bonferroni adjacent age groups’ comparisons (p = .006) revealed that 7-year-olds 
(M = .57) had fewer false alarms to critical lures than 11-year-olds (M = .77) who did not 
differ from adults (M = .68).  As for the uncorrected scores, the difference between 7-
year-olds and adults did not reach significance.  Overall, although the proportion of false 
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memories increased between 7 and 11 years of age, levels-of-processing had no effect on 
false memories regardless of age.   
In sum, levels-of-processing affected true recognition where shallow processing 
decreased and deep processing increased true memories.  In contrast, although false 
memories increased with age, levels-of-processing had no effect on false memory rates 
regardless of age.  Thus, levels-of-processing affects true but not false recognition and 
this latter effect is age invariant.  
Correlational Analysis 
In order to examine individual differences and the relation of true and false 
memories under different levels-of processing conditions, we conducted a correlational 
analysis for each age group separately.  Interestingly, for 7-year-olds there was a strong 
association between true and false recognition under shallow processing (r = .57, p < 
.001).  No further associations emerged, and none of the older two age groups’ true and 
false recognition performance revealed any positive correlations.  If anything, for adults 
there was a negative relation in the deep processing condition between true and false 
recognition (r = -.53, p = .009).  These findings suggest that when information is encoded 
at a shallow level, 7-year-olds’ true and false recognition performance are positively 
correlated, whereas for older children and adults they are unrelated.     
 Discussion 
When we examined the effects of levels-of-processing for true and false 
recognition separately, we found that encoding information at a deep level (sentence 
DRM) increased true recognition for the older age groups whereas encoding information 
at a shallow level (sentence dual-task DRM) decreased true recognition and this was the 
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case for all ages.  Thus, both shallow and deep processing affected true recognition rates 
for both children and adults.   In contrast, the levels-of-processing manipulation had no 
effect on false memory rates regardless of age.  The lack of a levels-of-processing effect 
on false recognition contrasts with previous research with adults (Rhodes & Anastasi, 
2000; Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia et al., 1999) that found that levels-of-
processing either decreased or increased false recognition depending on whether 
information had been encoded in a shallow or a deep fashion, respectively.  However, 
these contrasting findings may be due to individual differences in the susceptibility to 
false memories, something a between-participants design cannot control for.  Our results 
are in line with Seamon et al. (1998) who found that memory load had no effect or 
decreased false recognition depending on whether a within- or between-participants 
design was used, respectively.  The advantage of a within-participant design is that it 
controls for variability in false memory rates that occur especially in children and is more 
comparable to an everyday life scenario where some information may be encoded more 
deeply (e.g., an event that is particularly unusual or interesting such as taking a plane for 
going on holidays) and some information may be encoded on a shallow level (e.g., events 
that have been encountered many times such as a trip to the supermarket).  Furthermore, 
our results are consistent with the findings from Dewhurst and colleagues (Dewhurst et 
al., 2007).  They examined true and false recognition rates in 5-, 8-, and 11-year-olds’ in 
a standard DRM paradigm compared to a story condition.  Specifically, they found that 5-
year-olds’ true and false recognition rates were increased when information was 
presented in a story compared to the standard list format whereas no difference occurred 
for 8- and 11-year-olds.  This is exactly what we found with our 7- and 11-year-olds.  
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Thus, despite differences in story contents and presentation mode between Dewhurst and 
colleagues’ and the current study, both found similar false memory rates when 
information was presented in a story (deep processing) compared to standard DRM lists 
(standard processing) for both 7- and 11-year-olds. 
Despite our finding that there are no differences in levels-of-processing effects on 
children’s and adults’ false memories, shallow processing affected young children’s and 
adults’ memories differently as became apparent in the correlational analysis.  
Specifically, when 7-year-olds processed information in a shallow fashion, then the 
amount of false memories was dependent on the overall amount remembered and vice 
versa.  In contrast, for 11-year-olds false memories occurred under different levels of 
processing, independent of how much information was correctly or incorrectly 
remembered.  Moreover, for adults false memories occurred either independently of true 
memories or were even negatively related under deep processing.  These correlational 
findings may indicate that there are qualitative differences between 7-year-olds’ false 
memories and those of older children compared to adults.  That is, young children’s false 
memories may arise out of less automatic processes than adults’ because when they 
encode information incidentally their false recognition is contingent on true recognition.  
In contrast for adults, there appears to be no relation between how much is correctly or 
incorrectly remembered.  If anything, true and false recognition were negatively related 
under deep processing conditions in adults.  We will investigate this potential qualitative 




Experiment 2  
In Experiment 2 we divided attention during encoding.  A comparison of the 
different findings from research on divided attention and their mixed results may be 
difficult because of the different types of secondary tasks that have been used across 
studies (Gallo, 2006).  However, the studies by Dewhurst and colleagues (Dewhurst et 
al., 2005; Dewhurst et al., 2007; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007) have shown that at encoding, 
any secondary task that is resource demanding, whether it inhibits associative processes 
(e.g., generating random numbers during list encoding) or increases the memory load 
(e.g., remembering several digits during list encoding), prevents the generation of 
associative processes which in turn may reduce false recognition.  Because the tasks used 
in a divided attention paradigm in adult research are too demanding for children, we 
implemented a secondary task that is age appropriate and requires inhibitory processes.  
Inhibitory processes play a significant role in children’s memory (Bjorklund & 
Harnishfeger, 1995; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994).  Inhibition helps children to 
ignore irrelevant information and reduces sensitivity to interference (Dempster, 1992).  A 
lack of inhibition for irrelevant information may cause relevant information to be 
encoded less efficiently which may in turn weaken memory traces for relevant events 
(Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994).  Further, younger children have more problems than 
older children and adults when trying to inhibit irrelevant information as an intrusion into 
the to-be-remembered information (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995).  Thus, children’s 
inhibitory strength is directly linked to the magnitude of irrelevant intrusions in memory 
tasks.  Therefore, using an inhibitory task will directly interfere with memory processes.  
As an index for inhibitory processes, we implement the Day/Night-Stroop task (Gerstadt, 
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Hong, & Diamond, 1994) that is derived from the most classical test for measuring 
inhibitory processes in adults, the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935).  Previous research that has 
implemented the Day/Night-Stroop task with children has found significant increases in 
inhibitory abilities from 3½ to 7 years and to 11 years of age (Gerstadt, et al., 1994; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005).  Therefore, this task is an ideal measure for inhibitory 
processes within the child age range studied here.  In order to keep a direct comparison 
with adults and to control for secondary-task consistency, this task is also administered 
with adults.  Apart from classical studies investigating increases in inhibitory abilities, the 
Day/Night-Sroop task has also been used in several studies in order to predict memory 
errors following from suggestibility (e.g., Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, Edelstein, Quas, 
Shaver, 2002; Roberts & Powell, 2005; Schaaf, Alexander, & Goodman, 2008).  The 
basic idea is that children who are better at inhibiting a prepotent response may be less 
susceptible to suggestibility.  Based on previous research, dividing attention with an 
inhibitory task should reduce true recognition, as shown in Dewhurst and colleagues’ 
research where participants, for example, generated random numbers during list 
encoding.  For false recognition there are two possibilities: if false memories are derived 
from conscious elaboration processes, then divided attention should also reduce false 
recognition.  If false memories are derived from automatic associative processes, then 
false recognition should be little affected.  Moreover, if children’s false memories are 
generated in a similar way as adults’ false memories then we expect no age differences in 






A total of 60 children and adults (55% female) participated in this experiment, 20 
7-year-olds (M = 7.9, SD = 4 months), 20 11-year-olds (M = 11.8, SD = 5 months), and 
20 adults (M = 20 years, SD = 1 years).  The children were predominantly White, from a 
working class background, and were tested following parental consent and their own 
assent on the day of testing.  The adults were undergraduate students and received 
financial reimbursement for their participation.  
Design 
Overall, each participant received six 13-item standard DRM lists.  Three of them 
were presented in a divided attention paradigm at study.  Here, participants additionally 
performed the Day-Night Stroop task.  After that each participant received a 3½-minute 
distractor task followed by the recognition task.  
Materials and Procedure 
The six 13-item DRM lists (music, fruit, man, soft, needle, and foot) were all 
presented orally at a 2 second rate on a Mac computer and selected according to the same 
criteria as in Experiment 1 (see footnote 1).  Participants were instructed to remember as 
many list items as possible.  In addition, for 3 out of the 6 lists participants performed the 
Day-Night Stroop task (Gerstadt, et al., 1994; Simpson & Riggs, 2005).  Participants 
were instructed to press a dark blue button on the keyboard in response to a day scenario 
(yellow sun with white background) and a yellow button in response to a night scenario 
(white stars and moon with dark blue background).  This requires inhibiting a prepotent 
response.  Four practise trials preceded the study phase in order to familiarize participants 
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with the procedure.  Which 3 lists were presented in the divided-attention paradigm was 
counterbalanced between participants.  Further, the order of divided-attention was 
counterbalanced (i.e., either the first 3 lists were presented under divided attention or the 
last 3 lists).  After that all participants received a 3½-minute distractor task, followed by 
the 48-item recognition task, as in Experiment 1.  
Results 
Day-Night Stroop Task 
First, we were interested in how participants performed on the secondary task in 
the divided-attention condition.  Overall the proportion of correct responses was high and 
increased with age, F(2, 57) = 8.06, p = .001, ηp² = .22.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons 
indicated that 7-year-olds (M = .85) had fewer correct responses than 11-year-olds (M = 
.98, p = .004) and adults (M = .98, p = .002) and the latter two groups did not differ.  
Similarly, reaction time decreased with age, F(2, 57) = 11.0, p < .001, ηp² = .28; where 
both adults (M  = 1.69, p < .001) and 11-year-olds (M = 1.95, p = .013) responded faster 
than 7-year-olds (M = 2.42).  Both findings suggest an increase in inhibitory abilities 
between 7 and 11 years of age as well as adulthood.  
Chance Performance 
As in Experiment 1, we examined whether children and adults performed above 
chance on all 4 item types across the different conditions.  Seven-year-olds performed 
above chance on all item types (at least p < .05 and higher) except for correct items under 
divided attention and critical lures under full attention.  Eleven-year-olds performed 
above chance on all item types (at least p < .01 and higher) except for critical lures under 
divided attention.  Adults performed above chance on all item types (p < .001) except for 
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critical lures under both full and divided attention.  Thus, dividing attention affected 
children’s and adults’ performance differently.   
True and False Recognition 
As in the previous experiment, we investigated whether dividing attention at study 
affected true and false recognition in comparison to full attention and whether this effect 
was the same at all ages.  Proportion of “yes” responses to studied items, critical lures, 
related items, and unrelated items were analyzed separately in a series of 2(attention: full 
vs. divided) x 3(age: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) ANOVAs where the first 
factor was within-participant and the latter factor between-subjects.  Mean recognition 
scores are displayed in Table 2.   
For studied items there was a main effect for attention, F(1, 57) = 12.25, p = .001, 
ηp² = .18, where more studied items were correctly recognized under full attention (M = 
.75) than under divided attention (M = .64).  There was also a main effect for age, F(2, 
57) = 10.12, p < .001, ηp² = .26.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons (p < .001) indicated 
that 7-year-olds (M = .57) correctly recognized fewer items than both 11-year-olds (M = 
.76) and adults (M = .75) and the latter two groups did not differ.  Thus, divided attention 
at encoding decreased true memory rates across all ages.  
For critical lures there was a main effect for age, F(2, 57) = 4.92, p = .011, ηp² = 
.15.  Post-hoc Bonferroni adjacent age groups’ comparisons (p = .008) indicated that 7-
year-olds (M = .40) had lower levels of false recognition than 11-year-olds (M = .66) who 
did not differ from adults (M = .54).  The difference between 7-year-olds and adults did 
not reach significance.  In contrast to studied items, there was no effect of attention.  
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There were no other main effects or interactions.  Thus, whereas divided attention 
reduces accuracy (true recognition), there were no effects on false memories.  
At first glance this pattern of results suggests that divided attention affects true 
but not false recall across all ages.  However, when looking closer at the means in Table 
2, the magnitude of the differences between the full and divided attention is comparable 
for the 7- and 11-year olds for the correct items and critical lures (mean differences, 7-
year-olds = .12 and .14, respectively; 11-year-olds = .12 and .15, respectively).  However, 
the pattern is different for adults (mean difference = .10 and -.02, respectively).  Thus, 
despite differences in mean performance, statistically no interaction occurred and the 
pattern appears to be the same for children as for adults.  The fact that there was no 
interaction, suggests that there was a large variation in individual performance.  In order 
to investigate this further, we conducted a correlational analysis below.  
Overall Accuracy and False Alarms 
As in Experiment 1, we controlled for response bias and used the two-high 
threshold correction (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  As for raw scores, using the corrected 
scores for true recognition, a 2(attention: full vs. divided) x 3(age group: 7-year-olds vs. 
11-year-olds vs. Adults) ANOVA revealed a main effect for attention; F(1, 57) = 5.3, p = 
.025, ηp² = .09, where more studied items were correctly recognized under full attention 
(M = .56) than under divided attention (M = .46).  There was also a main effect for age 
group; F(2, 57) = 4.25, p = .019, ηp² = .13.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated 
that there was a reliable difference between 7-year-olds (M = .40, p = .016) and adults (M 
= .63) whereas the 11-year-olds’ level of recognition (M = .50) was in between and did 
not differ from the two age groups.  
 28 
Using the corrected scores for false recognition, a 2(attention: full vs. divided) x 
3(age group: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) ANOVA did not reveal any main 
effects.  
Thus, like the raw scores, for true recognition the level of attention affects 
performance and increases with age whereas for false recognition the level of attention 
had no effect.  In contrast to the raw score analysis, with the corrected scores, the age 
increase in false memory formation disappeared.    
Correlational analysis 
In order to control for individual differences in the susceptibility to false 
memories, we conducted a correlational analysis comparing correct and false recognition 
performance under full versus divided attention for each age group separately.  
Interestingly, there was a strong association between true and false recognition under 
divided attention for both 7-year-olds (r = .70, p < .001) and 11-year-olds (r = .57, p < 
.008).  There was no association between true and false recognition under full attention 
(7-year-olds: r = .24,n.s.; 11-year-olds: r = .34, n.s.).  In contrast, for adults true and false 
recognition were unrelated irrespective of attentional mode (full attention: r = .14; 
divided attention: r = .08, n.s.).  Thus, a different pattern emerges for children and adults 
under divided attention.  
Discussion 
The reduction of true recognition under divided attention is consistent with 
previous research that included adult participants (Dewhurst et al. 2005; 2007; Knott & 
Dewhurst, 2007).  However, these studies also found a similar decrease in false 
recognition under divided attention whereas the current results did not reveal any effect 
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of divided attention for false recognition.  This latter finding is more consistent with 
Seamon et al.’s (2003) study that did not find any effect of divided attention on false 
recognition in adults.  It is possible that the secondary task used may account for the 
differences in findings across studies.  However, previously used secondary tasks would 
not have been appropriate for the current purpose.  As noted earlier, it was important to 
use a secondary task that is taxing for both children and adults.  The Day/Night Stroop 
task has been administered with children in previous studies (e.g., Gerstadt et al., 1994; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005) but not with adults.  It is possible that this task was less 
demanding for adults than it was for children.  However, this seems unlikely given the 
finding that under divided attention true recognition decreased across all ages.   This 
finding suggests that the Day/Night Stroop task was effective in dividing attention for 
both children and adults4.  Moreover, the implementation of the Day/Night Stroop task 
allowed for objective measures of participants’ performances on the secondary task in 
comparison to previous studies that have used (e.g.) random number generation as a 
measure of divided attention.  The disadvantage with (e.g.) a random number generation 
is that participants perform this task internally.  Thus, there is no objective measure 
whether all participants follow the instructions properly, something that requires control 
in children.   
 Overall, although findings vary across studies that have implemented a divided-
attention paradigm, altogether it seems that the secondary task has to be a labor intensive 
continuous central executive task if it affects false memories (i.e., reduces them) as found 
in studies by Dewhurst and colleagues.  If a task has to be so demanding before divided 
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attention has an effect on false memories, then this may provide further indication that 
false memories are fairly robust and generated from automatic associative processes.         
However, the important finding concerns false recognition compared to true 
recognition as a function of attention in children compared to adults.  What the findings 
of our correlational analysis revealed is that for both child participant groups, true and 
false recognition were strongly associated when attention was divided.  In contrast, for 
adults, true and false memory formation was unrelated.  Specifically, when children 
encoded information under divided attention then the occurrence of false memories was 
dependent on the amount of true memories and vice versa.  What this finding suggests is 
that there may be qualitative differences in children’s and adults’ false memories.  That 
is, when the attentional level is low then children’s false memories seem to be contingent 
on the overall amount remembered whereas no such relation exists in adults.   
Finally, two of the current findings require closer attention.  First, we found very 
low levels of false recognition for adults under full attention.  We do not have a plausible 
explanation other than variations in populations and individual differences in 
susceptibility to false memories (also see Unsworth & Brewer, 2010).  Second, we found 
higher levels of false alarms to unrelated non-presented items for 11-year-olds than for 7-
year-olds.  Here the threshold corrected analysis provides more insight.  That is, despite 
11-year-olds’ high levels of false alarms to unrelated non-presented items, their overall 
true recognition rates are higher than those of 7-year-olds, although this is not statistically 
significant.  Thus, although 11-year-olds made more errors, in relation they also 




The current experiments were designed to assess the robustness of adults’ and 
children’s false memories and to establish whether there are differences in the 
automaticity with which false memories arise during the generation stage itself.  Across 
both experiments it has been demonstrated that manipulating levels-of-processing or 
dividing attention significantly affects both children’s and adults’ true memories.  
Conversely, false memory rates were left unaffected by any experimental manipulation of 
levels-of-processing or divided attention.  Most importantly, this latter effect was age 
invariant.  
At first glance these findings suggest that false memories are fairly robust and are 
generated automatically inasmuch as they are not affected by levels-of-processing or by 
dividing attention.   However, the lack of and age x divided attention interaction in 
Experiment 2 and the findings of our correlational analysis across both experiments give 
some grounds for caution.  In particular, in Experiment 1 we found that only under 
shallow processing and only for the youngest age group, false memory formation was 
significantly dependent on the amount of true recognition and vice versa.  Further, in 
Experiment 2 we found a similar pattern for divided attention for both child participant 
groups.  Here, only under divided attention and only for 7- and 11-year-olds, false 
recognition rates were dependent on true recognition and vice versa.  In contrast for 
adults, there appeared to be no association between true and false recognition across both 
experiments.  More importantly, we found this pattern despite an overall increase in the 
quantity of false recognition with age, which was due to an increase between the ages of 
7 and 11 (raw scores in both experiments and corrected scores in Experiment 1).  Adults’ 
 32 
false memory levels were relatively low and comparable to those of 11-year-olds but 
statistically did not differ significantly from those of 7-year-olds.  This finding reflects 
the fact that the susceptibility to false memories varies with variations in populations and 
converges on inconsistent findings from studies with adults on the effects of levels-of-
processing and divided attention as noted in the introduction.  Overall we found that 
when information is encoded incidentally (either through shallow processing or divided 
attention) then children’s false memory rates appear to differ from adults’ because their 
occurrence depends on the level of true memories (and vice versa) whereas for adults this 
was not the case.      
Two additional findings support the reliability of the current results.  First, across 
both experiments, levels-of-processing and divided attention affected true memory rates 
across all ages.  Thus, the manipulations implemented were effective for both children 
and adults.  Second, across both experiments, false memory rates increased with age, 
except for the corrected scores in Experiment 2.  Specifically, in both experiments false 
memories increased between 7 and 11 years of age but not into adulthood.  Additionally, 
the relation between true and false recognition under shallow processing and divided 
attention differed for 7-year-olds compared to both 11-year-olds and adults (Experiment 
1) and for both child participant groups compared to adults (Experiment 2).  This finding 
may indicate that potential differences in quality of false memories occur independently 
from quantitative changes.   
Most of our findings can be explained by both developmental false memory 
theories.  Both Fuzzy-Trace-Theory (Brainerd, et al., 2008) and Associative-Activation-
Theory (Howe, et al., 2009a) predict an increase in false memories with age, which we 
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found across both experiments.  Both theories agree that children need to have a 
semantic/associative lexicon or the necessary knowledge base in order to elicit false 
memories.  It is established that children can form associative links between concepts at a 
relatively young age, but these links are strengthened and refined with increases in both 
knowledge and experience (Bjorklund, 2005).  Thus, increases in the quantity of false 
memories with age have something to do with the fact that children simply gain more 
experience and knowledge of concepts and their relations in the world5.   
However, as previous research has shown, this increase in knowledge base alone 
cannot explain false memory increases with age (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro, 
Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Metzger, Warren, Shelton, Price, Reed, & 
Williams, 2008).  That is, false memory formation increases with age even when it is 
mapped onto the knowledge base of very young children.  Where the two false memory 
theories diverge is in the suggested processes that activate our semantic lexicon: 
associative-activation (AAT) versus gist extraction (FTT).  As noted above, quantitative 
increases can be well explained by both theories.  Qualitative differences between 
children’s and adults’ false memories, specifically differences in automaticity, are 
predicted by AAT whereas FTT does not make any specific claims with regard to 
automaticity. 
Altogether, our findings fit into recent research that found increases in the 
automaticity of the generation of word associates that may lead to false memories 
between the ages of 5, 7, and 11(Wimmer & Howe, 2009).  This finding may indicate 
qualitative differences between younger and older primary school aged children in the 
generation of false memories.  Other research has shown that there are developmental 
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differences in automatic processing after false memories have been generated.  
Specifically, research on directed forgetting shows that adults’ true memory rates are 
significantly reduced under directed forgetting instructions whereas false memory rates 
are not (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Seamon et al., 2002).  In contrast, both children’s true 
and false memory rates are reduced given a directed forgetting instruction (Howe, 2005; 
Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, in press).  Thus, according to these studies there appears to be 
qualitative, as well as quantitative, developmental differences in false memories after 
information has been generated or encoded such that false items may enter children’s 
conscious awareness whereas they can remain outside of conscious awareness for adults.   
The question whether children’s and adults’ false memories differ qualitatively 
may be of fundamental importance for forensic settings.  In particular, the finding that 
children’s false memories may be less automatic than those of adults but may be derived 
from more effortful conscious processing, may allow for using different memorial 
strategies (e.g., directed forgetting, Howe, 2005) in order to control for the occurrence of 
false memories in an interview situation and may in turn increase the reliability of 
children’s forensic reports.   
A further important issue is whether results arising from the DRM paradigm can 
have implications for the legal arena.  That is, because the DRM paradigm is limited to 
study-list procedures there is some discussion whether the DRM paradigm is a valid tool 
for investigating false memories in the real world (e.g., Pezdek & Lam, 2007).  Evidence 
suggests that findings from the DRM paradigms can also translate into real world settings 
(e.g., Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelmann, 1998) but more research is warranted that 
explores this generalization.  The advantage of using a controlled laboratory-based 
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technique is that it allows examining the core cognitive processes underlying false 
memories that can occur in everyday-life.  This may also explain the wealth of empirical 
research that has implemented the DRM paradigm over the last decade (see Brainerd et 
al., 2008 for an overview).  For the current purpose, the implementation of the DRM 
paradigm proved useful because it allowed us to investigate whether there would be 
qualitative differences in children’s and adults’ false memories that can be attributed to 
cognitive factors per se.   
In sum the current research reveals two main findings.  Levels-of-processing and 
divided-attention manipulations both affect true recognition across all ages.  Individually, 
the occurrence of false memories depends on the overall amount of information 
remembered when information is processed on a shallow level (7-year-olds) and under 
divided attention (7- and 11-year-olds) and vice versa whereas for adults false memories 
occur irrespective of the amount of information correctly remembered.  This may suggest 
a qualitative difference in children’s and adults’ false memory formation.  Recent 
research has shown that children’s formation of associative concepts increases in 
automaticity with age but is already fairly automatic by the age of 5 (Wimmer & Howe, 
2009).  What the current research adds is that children’s false memories may also differ 
in the quality to those generated by adults.  Further research will be required to establish 
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1 All DRM study lists/items were obtained from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and 
Gallo (2001) and were chosen according to their high backward associative strength 
(BAS) to the critical lure and their high word frequency values using the word frequency 
norms of British primary school aged children’s printed vocabulary (Stuart, Masterson, 
Dixon, & Quinlan, 1993-1996).  All items were presented in descending BAS to the 
critical lure.  This also applies to the DRM lists used in Experiment 2.  
² One potential problem with analysing performance against chance is that it does not 
give us insights into why some participants do not differ from chance.  That is, there are 
two possibilities: (a) participants are unable to remember the items and answer randomly 
“yes” or “no” (chance performance 0.5) or (b) participants answer systematically “no” 
when they do not remember the items and really remember only half of the items (true 
performance 0.5).  Therefore, the two-high threshold method is a better measure for 
discrimination and response bias. 
³The two-high threshold method is, according to Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), a more 
sensitive measure than other signal detection indices (e.g., A), one that permits the 
identification of response bias and discrimination among participants even when they are 
performing close to chance.  
4
 The possibility remains that the task was performed serially (i.e., item encoded then 
button pressed) rather than fully under divided attention (i.e., item encoded while button 
pressed).  Nevertheless, it seems to have effectively divided attention across all ages 
because it reduced true recognition across all ages.  If the task had been only effective in 
 45 
children, then we should have found an age x attention interaction which was not the 
case.   
5
 In the current research we tried to control for knowledge base effects by using DRM 
lists containing high word-frequency items suitable for primary school aged children.  
The finding that across both experiments in all standard conditions, even our youngest 
age group remembered significantly more than by pure chance suggests that the lists were 
appropriate for the age range examined.  Nevertheless, a database as the Neslon, McEvoy 
and Schreiber (1999) database for adults’ word association norms would be warranted for 







Table 1. Mean proportions of recognized studied items, related non-presented items, 
unrelated non-presented items, and critical lures across ages as a function of level of 
processing (standard deviation in parenthesis) in Experiment 1.  
  7-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
Standard  Studied .80 (.19) .86 (.13) .88 (.21) 
 Related .09 (.17) .09 (.15) .12 (.18) 
 Unrelated .05 (.15) .10 (.20) .04 (.14) 
 Critical Lures .72 (.30) .82 (.33) .72 (.36) 
Deep Studied .72 (.28) .85 (.17) .95 (.08) 
 Related .15 (.20) .19 (.23) .09 (.16) 
 Unrelated .12 (.27) .00 (0) .04 (.14) 
 Critical lures .65 (.29) .85 (.29) .72 (.33) 
Shallow Studied .48 (.29) .70 (.23) .76 (.21) 
 Related .10 (.15) .21 (.19) .11 (.18) 
 Unrelated .10 (.20) .02 (.11) .09 (.19) 




Table 2. Mean proportions of recognized studied items, related non presented items, 
unrelated non presented items, and critical lures across ages in a full attention versus 
divided attention paradigm at study (standard deviation in parenthesis) in Experiment 2.  
 7-year-olds 11-year-olds Adults 
 Full  Divided  Full  Divided Full  Divided  
Studied .63 (.22) .51 (.24) .82 (.11) .70 (.26) .80 (.12) .70 (.15) 
Related .15 (.20) .17 (.20) .22 (.26) .23 (.27) .12 (.15) .14 (.17) 
Unrelated .17 (.25) .17 (.28) .27 (.32) .25 (.36) .12 (.16) .12 (.22) 







Figure 1. Mean threshold corrected scores of true and false recognition across all ages as 
a function of level of meaning processing in Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. Mean threshold corrected scores of true and false recognition across all ages as   




















































Experiment 1: sentences used in the shallow and deep processing conditions.  
 
Critical Lure: Sleep 
 
After lunch I decided to have a short nap 
Soon I started to doze 
I thought that it would be more comfortable to go to bed 
Suddenly I was awake 
But I felt very drowsy 
And I went for another snooze 
I fell into a deep slumber 
I was so tired 
I needed a proper rest 
Suddenly I heard a loud snore 
And I started to wake 
I was having a very funny dream 




Critical Lure: Cold 
 
Last summer it was hot 
But today I started to shiver 
The temperature is arctic 
And it feels frigid 
My hands are going to freeze 
This year it has been chilly  
This morning came the frost 
By lunchtime it was a little bit warm 
This has melted the ice 
It may be a long winter 
Hopefully with plenty of snow 
Recently there was hardly any heat 





Critical Lure: Bread 
 
My mouth tasted of rye 
Probably because I took a bite from this huge loaf 
There was also lots of butter 
Which is really nice on top of toast 
Sometimes I make the dough 
And once I lost a tooth when biting into the thick crust 
Another time my hands were white from all the flour 
But my favourite is my grandma’s special sandwich 
With lots of home made jam 
And a large portion of jelly 
I like a very thin slice 
And a glass of milk 





Critical Lure: Lion 
 
The mouth opened and there was a very load roar 
Everything was under control according to the tamer 
He also controlled the tiger 
Then he touched his soft mane 
His response was fierce 
Then he looked into the den 
Inside was this cute little cub 
For safety he was put back into the cage 
Originally he was living in the jungle 
There were also some bears 
Typically he has his head held high walking with the pride 
Unfortunately he is not as free as in Africa 





Critical Lure: Doctor 
 
I opened my eyes and saw the physician 
Next to him stood a friendly looking nurse 
And I felt something cold on my stomach, which must be the stethoscope 
Then there was another person, probably the surgeon 
It is not very comfortable being a patient 
I do not like being in a clinic 
But what I like even less is visiting the dentist 
Originally I had an interest in medicine 
Then I thought I better become a lawyer 
I did not stay in good health 
And became sick 
I hope that there will be a quick cure 





Critical Lure: Shirt 
 
This is a lovely blue blouse 
I like it with long sleeves 
And it has a nice collar 
Oh, I will also need some shorts 
Ideally with a button 
In America they call them pants 
I also like this one that looks like a polo 
No, I prefer the jersey 
Without any cuffs 
Maybe I should also buy a vest 
I also need to get a tie 
Hopefully I have enough money in my pocket 
And all these things do not need an iron 
 
 
 
 
 
